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Our urban life-style, with its intensity and bustle, is often compared to life within
a colony of social insects. But the similarities are superficial: Most humans working in
large teams are not related, whereas insects in a colony are usually very closely related.
The recent trend toward globalization, epitomized by a worldwide market and universal
communications network, hints at the emergence of a superorganism composed of all
members of the human race, but not based on genetic ties.
Modern human societies, with their economies revolving around stock markets and
bond trading, are highly complex, yet theorists interested in the evolution of human co-
operation and communication prefer to study the simplest aspects of human society, such
as cooperation within a household. This became clear at a meeting held this summer in
the picturesque Austrian town of Steyr1. The meeting brought together scientists from
two vastly different backgrounds: the evolutionary biologists, including those studying
human as well as animal behavior, and the social scientists, including anthropologists and
economists.
Interestingly, both of these groups – representative of our two selves – assume that the
societies that they study are composed of selfish individuals, and each group has coined
its own definition of selfishness. Economists think of the selfish individual as someone
who uses rational behavior to achieve personal preferences or goals (Homo economicus),
whereas biologists view selfishness in terms of selfish genes that when selected maximize
their chance of being passed on to the next generation.
The symposium opened with an address by John Maynard Smith (University of Sussex,
UK), a founding father of the field of evolutionary biology, who described some of the
major transitions in evolution2. He proposed that the emergence of cooperation and
communication among our hominid ancestors was but the last (at least so far) evolutionary
flourish following in the footsteps of earlier evolutionary leaps in which competing entities
joined forces to form a stronger, larger unit upon which natural selection could work -
– the fates of genes are linked together in chromosomes; ancient bacteria become the
building blocks of eukaryotic cells; there is coordination among different cell types in a
complex multicellular organism; individuals, be they termites or humans, unite in colonies
or societies.
In each of these cases, the individual building blocks have to work toward a common
goal rather than for their own immediate benefit, and so the temptation to defect looms
large. In fact, societies – whether they be cellular, insect, or human – are composed
of would-be mutineers. As David Haig (Harvard University, USA) pointed out when
describing his kinship theory of genomic imprinting3, individuals in a colony or society are
not single-purpose agents but may be torn by opposing interests. For example, genes that
program either rapid dispersal of offspring or greater parental care of offspring can result
in different outcomes depending on whether the gene is inherited from the father or the
mother. Expression of a gene for rapid dispersal of offspring shortens the weaning period,
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Figure 1: The Centipede Game. You and a coplayer are sitting on opposite sides of
a table. On your side of the table are two stacks of money, one smaller than the other.
You can either STOP the game by taking the larger stack, leaving the smaller one for
your coplayer, or GO to the next round by pushing both stacks to your coplayer’s side
of the table. In this case, the experimenter adds $1 to each stack. It is now the other
player who can STOP the game and pocket the larger stack, leaving the smaller one for
you, or alternatively GO to the next round by pushing both stacks to your side, in which
case each stack increases by $1 again. But the rules require that the stacks cross the
middle-line at the most 20 times. At the beginning of the game, one stack contains $3
and the other stack $1. If you and your coplayer opt for GO as long as you can, you will
end up with $23 and your coplayer with $21. But, in the last round, your coplayer has
two options: to push the stacks toward you or alternatively to pocket the larger stack
(which contains $22), leaving you with the smaller stack (only $20). If you suspect that
your coplayer will pocket the larger stack in the final round, then you should not push the
stacks toward your coplayer in the penultimate round, but rather should take the larger
stack for yourself ($21). Arguing backwards, you can quickly see that you should never
choose GO, but should choose STOP right away. But this leaves you with only $3! In
actual experiments, people rarely adopt this ”rational” but counterproductive stance.
a great advantage to the mother, and so it is more likely that a maternal rather than a
paternal copy of this gene will be expressed.
The common language of the meeting was evolutionary game theory, which assumes
that a particular type of behavior (strategy for interacting with other members of a group)
is more likely to spread within the group if it leads to success4. Mathematicians developed
game theory about 50 years ago to explain the economics of human societies. Despite its
popularity, game theory was slow to catch on among skeptical economists. It was not until
evolutionary biologists applied game theory to explain behavioral traits in social animals
– such as sentinels providing the alarm call for their threatened colony and putting them-
selves at risk of being spotted by the predator (an unselfish behavior) – that mainstream
economists became more receptive to game theory.
Evolutionary game theory5 can explain a diverse spectrum of social behaviors – such
as conflict, cooperation and coordination – confirming, as Robert May (Oxford University,
UK) stressed in his address, that very simple rules can explain the complex behavior of
societies6. With a few party hats and cunningly simple games such as “the Centipede
Game”7 (see the figure), Andrew Colman (University of Leicester, UK) clearly demon-
strated that game theory enables irrational behavior in humans to be observed. There
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are few better examples for demonstrating how irrational behavior can actually benefit
economic exchange than the “Public goods” game. Four persons are given $10 each by
the experimenter, and asked (independently) to invest any part of it into a common pool.
The experimenter then doubles this common pool and distributes it evenly among the four
players. If all players invest their whole sum, they can double it. But the temptation to
freeload is strong because players get back only half of their own offerings. Nevertheless,
a substantial number of the players contribute a lot. But if the game is repeated for a
few more rounds, the players learn quickly to defect; soon, all contributions are negligible
– and so are the earnings, of course. The whole game changes dramatically, however, if
the players can, at the end of each round, punish their less generous coplayers by fining
their accounts. This punishment is economically irrational, because the fines return to
the experimenter, not to the punisher; in fact, the rules request that punishers have to
pay half as much as the fine they impose. In his talk, Ernst Fehr (University of Zu¨rich,
Switzerland) showed that, nevertheless, the tendency to engage in this costly (and irra-
tional) form of punishment is widespread, and its effect is beneficial: Players invest for
fear of being punished8. As Mark Twain put it, “the surest protection against temtation
is cowardice.”
Punishment is a newcomer to the long list of possible factors influencing coopera-
tion among individuals, which includes kinship and reciprocal altruism (where an act of
generosity is returned either by a recipient or a third party). Reciprocal altruism has
been demonstrated in animals as diverse as stickleback and cichlid fish, chimpanzees, and
undergraduates9. The possibility that cooperation is based on reciprocal altruism (that is,
whatever we do, we expect some sort of return) becomes less likely as the size of the group
increases because, in larger groups, the interactions among individuals are more numer-
ous and more complex. This is particularly intriguing as group size may well have been
the decisive factor enabling Homo sapiens to displace its Neanderthal ancestor10 – larger
groups meant pressure for selection of genes that favored intricate neural pathways11 and
the greater communication capabilities of language12.
The development of human language is a recent evolutionary transition. Language
consists of words and the grammar rules that arrange them. Words are stored in a person’s
mental lexicon, whereas rules are generated by a computational grammar book that enables
us to produce an infinite number of sentences. Understanding how language evolved is one
of the great challenges still facing evolutionary biologists. By building models of language
that interface with linguistics, computer science, and learning theory, we soon should be
able to explain how natural selection enabled the emergence of our universal language
capabilities.
Early philosophers – such as, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hume – realized that economic
exchange is dominated less by rational deliberation and more by a set of instincts (human
nature). Now we are ready to design experiments, encompassing both natural and social
science, to test models of human nature, thus allowing these two scientific worlds to merge.
3
References
1. The European Science Days on ”The Evolution of Cooperation and Communication”
were held from 4 to 8 July 2000. See http://www.sync-relations.at.
2. J. Maynard Smith, E. Szathmary, The Origins of Life (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford,
1999)
3. D. Haig, Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst., in press; D. Krakauer, A. Mira, Nature 400, 125
(1999)
4. J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford,
1982).
5. J. Hofbauer, K. Sigmund EvolutionaryGames and Population Dynamics (Cambridge
Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1998)
6. R. M. May, Nature 261, 459 (1976)
7. A. Colman, Game Theory and Its Applications in the Social and Biological Sciences
(Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 1995).
8. E. Fehr, S. Ga¨chter, Eur. Econ. Rev. 42, 232 (1998); R. Boyd, R. Richerson, Ethol.
Sociobiol. 13, 171 (1992).
9. M. A. Nowak, R. May, Nature 359, 826 (1992); M. Taborsky, Adv. Study Behav. 23,
1 (1994); M. Milinski, Nature 325, 433 (1987); F. B. de Waal, M. L. Berger, Nature
404, 563 (2000); C. Wedekind, M. Milinski, Science 288, 850 (2000).
10. C.B. Stringer, in B. Sykes, Ed., Human Inheritance: Genes, Language and Evolution
(Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1999), pp. 33-44.
11. J.J. Hopfield, in Critical Problems in Physics, V.L. Fitch et al., Eds. (Princeton
Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999), pp. 29-49.
12. S. Pinker, The Language Instinct (Penguin, London 1994); R.S. Jackendoff, The
Architecture of the Language Faculty (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997); M.A.
Nowak et al., Nature 404, 495 (2000).
4
